The contribution of female health to economic development by Bloom, David E. et al.
3Institute of Economics
HOHENHEIM DISCUSSION PAPERS
IN BUSINESS, ECONOMICS AND SOCIAL SCIENCES
www.wiso.uni-hohenheim.deSta
te
: S
pt
em
be
r 2
01
6
THE CONTRIBUTION OF FEMALE HEALTH 
TO ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT
David E. Bloom 
Harvard T. H. Chan School of Public Health
Michael Kuhny
Wittgenstein Centre, Vienna Institute of Demography
Klaus Prettner
University of Hohenheim 
DISCUSSION PAPER 11-2016
 
 
 
Discussion Paper 11-2016 
 
 
 
 
The contribution of female health to economic development. 
 
 
 
 
David E. Bloom, Michael Kuhn, Klaus Prettner 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Download this Discussion Paper from our homepage: 
 
https://wiso.uni-hohenheim.de/papers 
 
 
 
 
 
ISSN 2364-2076 (Printausgabe) 
ISSN 2364-2084 (Internetausgabe) 
 
 
 
 
Die Hohenheim Discussion Papers in Business, Economics and Social Sciences dienen der 
schnellen Verbreitung von Forschungsarbeiten der Fakultät Wirtschafts- und Sozialwissenschaften. 
Die Beiträge liegen in alleiniger Verantwortung der Autoren und stellen nicht notwendigerweise die 
Meinung der Fakultät Wirtschafts- und Sozialwissenschaften dar. 
 
 
   
 
 Hohenheim Discussion Papers in Business, Economics and Social Sciences are intended to make 
results of the Faculty of Business, Economics and Social Sciences research available to the public in 
order to encourage scientific discussion and suggestions for revisions. The authors are solely 
responsible for the contents which do not necessarily represent the opinion of the Faculty of Business, 
Economics and Social Sciences. 
  
The contribution of female health to economic development
David E. Bloom∗, Michael Kuhn†, and Klaus Prettner‡
August 2016
Abstract
We analyze the economic consequences for less developed countries of investing in female
health. We do this through developing and calibrating a novel micro-founded dynamic gen-
eral equilibrium model in which parents trade off the number of children against investments
in their education and in which we allow for health-related gender differences in productivity.
We show that better female health speeds up the demographic transition and thereby the
take-off toward sustained economic growth. By contrast, male health improvements delay
the transition and take-off because ceteris paribus they raise fertility. Investing in female
health is therefore a potent lever for promoting development.
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1 Introduction
The interplay between gender (in)equality and economic development has received considerable
attention in recent literature.1 However, a key aspect of gender inequality has to do with
health, and this has not yet been thoroughly examined.2 Generally, four channels appear to
matter: (i) Healthy women are more able to participate productively in the labor market with
direct consequences for effective labor supply and hence the level and growth of economic output
(Albanesi and Olivetti, 2016). (ii) Better health increases the returns to educational investments:
This occurs both through lower morbidity, allowing for greater labor market participation at
the intensive margin, and lower mortality, affecting labor market participation at the extensive
margin (Jayachandran and Lleras-Muney, 2009; Albanesi and Olivetti, 2014). (iii) Better health
of mothers directly affects the health of children through in utero effects and the mothers’ ability
to breastfeed and nourish their children in other ways (Field et al., 2009; Bhalotra and Rawlings,
2011). Female health thereby improves development prospects over the long run through direct
intergenerational transmission of human capital (cf. Case and Ardington, 2006; Bloom et al.,
2014a). (iv) Better female health may lower fertility and thus youth dependency with a knock-
on effect on female labor participation and educational investments (Bloom et al., 2009). Lower
fertility may arise as a direct consequence of improved reproductive health through availability
of contraceptives (Bailey, 2006), but it is also triggered indirectly as a response to changes in
the female opportunity costs of child rearing and changes in the returns to education. The
consequence is a swing in the quality-quantity trade-off toward the quality of children (e.g.
Galor and Weil, 2000; Soares and Falca˜o, 2008; de la Croix and Vander Donckt, 2010).
In this paper we develop a micro-founded dynamic general equilibrium model that examines
some of the mechanisms by which improvements in female health can stimulate economic de-
velopment. Overlapping generations of families choose consumption, numbers of children, and
educational investments in their children. Education in turn translates into the stock of human
capital of the next generation. We integrate decision-making at the household level into a two-
sector economy, in which effective labor is either combined with a fixed factor in the production
1See for example Galor and Weil (1996), Knowles et al. (2002), Lagerlo¨f (2003, 2005), Abu-Ghaida and Klasen
(2004), Iyigun and Walsh (2007), Soares and Falca˜o (2008), Doepke and Tertilt (2009, 2014), Kimura and Yasui
(2010), Schober and Winter-Ebmer (2011), Rees and Riezman (2012), Diebolt and Perrin (2013a,b), Hiller (2014),
and Prettner and Strulik (2016) for the role and evolution of gender inequality in economic development.
2See Stenberg et al. (2014) for the potential effects of female health on economic development. An extensive
systematic review of the economic and noneconomic literature on female health and its role for development is
presented in Iversen et al. (2014).
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of goods or employed within an education sector. We solve for the dynamic general equilibrium
and study the macroeconomic repercussions of individual choices, and thereby the conditions
under which the economy switches from a low-growth regime that corresponds to a poverty
trap with high fertility and no educational investments into a modern sustained growth regime
with declining fertility and increasing educational investments. Note that we do not analyze the
historical take-off to sustained long-run growth that is associated with the industrial revolution
in currently industrialized countries. Rather we focus on contemporaneously poor countries
that can benefit from technological spillovers from the rest of the world (for an appropriate
description of the historical evolution from stagnation to growth see Galor and Weil, 2000).3
Our particular focus is on the role of female health, which affects female labor productivity
and female labor force participation for any given level of education. Two findings motivate
this focus: First, health is a crucial element of human capital and, as such, represents a cen-
tral determinant of individual productivity (cf. Bloom et al., 2004; Bloom and Canning, 2005;
Prettner et al., 2013). Second, while women face a longer life span than men, they experience
higher productivity losses due to greater morbidity during their working lives (cf. Bonilla and
Rodriguez, 1993; Vos et al., 2012).
We examine how household choices vary with the level of female health and what the im-
plications are for macroeconomic outcomes. Specifically, we seek to understand whether better
female health contributes to higher rates of economic growth and an earlier transition from
stagnation to sustained economic growth. As healthier females have better access to the labor
market (and higher earnings), raising children incurs a higher opportunity cost even within
the high-fertility regime. This tends to enhance economic growth from technology adoption
although the distinction may be insubstantial until the take-off. More importantly, better fe-
male health facilitates the economic transition in that it lowers the earnings threshold at which
educational investments in children become profitable. These investments then trigger both
the educational and demographic transition that underlie economic development. While this
suggests a decidedly positive role for female health in economic development, an offsetting ten-
dency exists. This is because greater participation of healthy women in the labor market raises
aggregate labor supply, which in turn depresses earnings in the low-growth regime and, thereby,
3The article by Galor and Weil (2000) laid the foundations of Unified Growth Theory. For other contributions
and extensive overviews see e.g. Ko¨gel and Prskawetz (2001), Jones (2001), Hansen and Prescott (2002), Galor
and Moav (2002, 2004, 2006), Doepke (2004), Galor (2005, 2011), Cervellati and Sunde (2005), Strulik and
Weisdorf (2008), and Strulik et al. (2013).
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the incentive for households to undertake investments in education. However, we show both
analytically and numerically that despite this offsetting effect, female health unambiguously
speeds up the economic transition.
We contrast these findings with the impact of improvements in male health alone, as well as
with equiproportional improvements in the health of both sexes. By a pure income effect, male
health improvements tend to increase fertility and, thereby, slow down economic growth and the
progress toward economic transition. For equiproportional health improvements for both sexes,
we find that economic growth during the low-growth regime remains unaffected, while it rises in
the sustained growth regime. Strikingly, this finding mirrors the empirical results of Cervellati
and Sunde (2011), who find that health improvements foster growth of per capita income after
the demographic transition but not prior to it. Furthermore, we find that equiproportional
health investments promote the transition from low growth to sustained growth, although not
to the same extent as female health investments alone do.
Taken as a whole, our findings suggest a distinct role for development policies targeted at
female health improvements. Potential policies might include the reduction of iodine deficiency,
which, during pregnancy, has a more severe negative effect on the cognitive abilities of female
children than of male children (cf. Field et al., 2009), and vaccination against human papilloma
virus to prevent cervical cancer, which is the second deadliest cancer among women in the de-
veloping world (cf. Luca et al., 2014). While such policies may be based on female disadvantage
regarding access to health care to begin with,4 our analysis suggests an additional rationale on
development grounds: targeting female health tends to lead economies out of poverty traps or
at least to significantly accelerate progress towards an economic take-off. Furthermore, female
health tends to foster long-run growth prospects as well. However, targeting female rather
than male health comes at a lower instantaneous utility gain to the household. This high-
lights a conflict between the short-term interests of utility-maximizing households and long-run
development goals (cf. Duflo, 2012).
While we understand health and differences in health across genders to be exogenous for
much of our analysis, we show in subsection 6.2 that our results are robust when allowing for
endogenous and gender-specific investments in health. Notably, we show that men may be
4See e.g. Deaton (2008) and Molini et al. (2010) for evidence that the distribution of height and BMI is biased
against women, Bhalotra (2010) and Baird et al. (2011) for disproportionate mortality of girls in the presence of
economic crisis, and Bloom et al. (2001) and Self and Grabowski (2012) for evidence on difficulties for women to
access health care when they lack autonomy.
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advantaged in terms of health investments and health outcomes as a consequence of households
seeking to maximize their net income. This result is notable insofar as we do not have to resort
to tastes or social norms to explain discrimination against women in terms of health and health
care. Adding elements of taste-based discrimination would only strengthen our findings.
Unlike previous work that has focused on partial equilibrium or stable growth paths, we
are able to characterize the impact of gender-specific health on the full process of economic
development. This allows us to highlight the role of general equilibrium repercussions and to
explicitly calculate the timing of the economic transition. By emphasizing the role of female
health in economic development, our model bears some resemblance to the theoretical analyses
in Jayachandran and Lleras-Muney (2009), Albanesi and Olivetti (2014, 2016), de la Croix
and Vander Donckt (2010), and Age´nor et al. (2010). The first two of these articles examine
how fertility and educational choices at the household level depend on maternal mortality but
do not extend the analyses into a macroeconomic framework. Albanesi and Olivetti (2016)
consider the role of improvements of maternal health on female labor supply with exogenous
fertility and again within a partial equilibrium framework. de la Croix and Vander Donckt
(2010) consider the impact of female health, modeled as more years lived in good health, on
fertility and gender-specific educational investments in a collective household model with Nash
bargaining. While they can conclude that female health contributes to a transition to a low-
fertility regime with educational investments in both male and female children, de la Croix and
Vander Donckt’s macroeconomic environment is limited to an exogenous increase in wages over
time. While our framework features a simpler model of the household (although one that gives
rise to similar mechanics), its general equilibrium formulation allows a complete analysis of the
general equilibrium effects that modulate the transition. Furthermore, our framework allows us
to explicitly calculate how gender-specific health investments affect the timing of the economic
transition.5 Finally, Age´nor et al. (2010) consider a complex household model within a general
equilibrium framework. Their work highlights the role of public infrastructure for accessing
health care, thus giving the analysis a somewhat different focus. Furthermore, they concentrate
on balanced growth paths, whereas we are particularly interested in the transition process.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 introduces the model, solves for
5While not analyzing explicitly the role of female health but rather the effects of a general increase in longevity,
Soares and Falca˜o (2008) nevertheless highlight several similar channels through which health improvements foster
the economic-demographic transition by altering female labor supply and fertility. Similar to de la Croix and
Vander Donckt (2010), their model, too, remains a partial equilibrium/household level analysis.
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optimal choices at the household level, and sets out the market equilibrium. Section 3 is devoted
to the dynamics of the model and develops our main result regarding the impact of female and
male health on the economic transition, while Section 4 considers policy implications. Section
5 numerically characterizes the impact of gender-specific health on the development process.
Section 6 shows that our results are robust with respect to collective household decision making,
endogenous health, and the inclusion of physical capital, and Section 7 concludes.
2 The model
In this section we develop a simple analytically tractable dynamic general equilibrium model of
economic development, featuring differences in male and female health. Time evolves discretely,
and in generation t the economy is populated by Nt/2 couples formed out of a pool of Nt
individuals. We assume that males and females pair randomly after coming of age. Each couple
jointly decides on consumption, the number of children, and the educational investments in each
child. The last two decisions determine the population growth rate and the individual human
capital level, respectively, which then jointly determine the available aggregate human capital
stock of the economy in the next generation t+ 1.
The aggregate human capital stock net of the time that is spent on child rearing can be
employed in two sectors: goods production and education. Educational investments of parents
determine employment in the education sector, while aggregate consumption determines em-
ployment in final goods production. The only input in the education sector is teachers Lt,E ,
while final goods are produced by using workers Lt,Y , natural resources of fixed supply X,
and the technologies available to generation t, denoted by At (see Galor and Weil, 2000). It
is assumed that less developed countries have no research sector for the development of new
technologies, but rather adopt technologies developed in more advanced countries. For a jus-
tification of this assumption see Jones (2002), Keller (2002), and Ha and Howitt (2007), who
show that the largest industrialized countries almost exclusively drive the technological frontier
of the world. Following Benhabib and Spiegel (2005), p. 941, we model the speed of technology
adoption as being positively influenced by the technological gap between the less developed
countries and the technology leaders and negatively influenced by the gap in human capital.
The former can be justified by the notion that the adoption of new technologies is more likely
to pay off when the incremental outputs that can be produced by using them are larger (cf.
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Howitt, 2000; Acemoglu et al., 2006), while the latter can be justified by the notion that ac-
cessing new technology and adapting it to local conditions requires a certain level and mix of
skills (cf. Nelson and Phelps, 1966).
2.1 Household choices
Consider a less developed economy populated by male-female couples whose preferences are
captured by the following utility function:
u = log (ct) + γ log (nt) + δ log (e¯+ et) , (1)
where ct denotes joint adult consumption, nt refers to the number of children, et denotes invest-
ment in the education of the offspring, and e¯ represents the education level that children have
without any educational investments by their parents (cf. Strulik et al., 2013). The rationale for
e¯ > 0 is that children acquire knowledge during childhood by observing parents and peers. The
parameters γ and δ measure the utility weight of the number of children and their education,
respectively. Note that we follow a short-cut formulation in which education enters the utility
function directly. The notion that individuals experience a “warm glow” from providing their
children with a certain level of education justifies this short-cut (cf. Andreoni, 1989). It is well
known that the results of utility maximization are similar to a formulation in which children’s
income raises parental utility6 (the latter formulation is used e.g. by Galor and Weil, 2000;
Galor, 2005, 2011). The budget constraint of the couple is given by
ξmŵt + ξf ŵt(1− ψnt) = ct + etnt, (2)
where ŵt = wtht refers to the wage rate per unit of time, depending on the human capital
of adults, ht, and the wage rate per unit of human capital, wt.
7 The parameter ξj , in which
j = {m, f}, measures the extent to which gender-specific health allows an individual to work
productively, while the parameter ψ refers to the fraction of time required for giving birth to and
caring for one child. We impose the restriction ψ > 0 to ensure that fertility is finite and utility is
6This is evident by noting that log(wt+1ht+1) = log(wt+1) + log(ht+1), where wt+1 and ht+1 denote the wage
rate and human capital, respectively, in period t + 1. The first term is exogenous to the household, and so it
drops out of the optimization problem, while the second term is determined by education.
7Note that we abstract from politically, socially, and institutionally motivated gender-specific wage discrim-
ination. Incorporating such an analysis would not change our central results as long as discrimination was not
too severe such that women were prohibited from labor market participation. However, it would come at a
substantial reduction in expositional clarity.
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bounded and ψ < 1 such that one child does not require the whole available time of the mother.
Altogether, household income on the left-hand side of the equation comprises the husband’s and
the wife’s earnings, both not only increasing in the (common) level of human capital but also
in gender-specific productivity as determined by gender-specific health. Because, particularly
in developing countries, time use patterns show that the contribution of mothers to child care
dwarfs the contribution of fathers (according to Berniell and Sa´nchez-Pa´ramo, 2011; Duflo,
2012, women spend 70% more time on child care than men in Sweden; the difference in Iraq is
by a much larger factor of 10), we set the male contribution to zero and assume that women
shoulder the full burden of child care. Thus, female earnings are lowered by the (full) amount
of time ψnt required for bearing and rearing nt children. This means that quality-independent
child costs are represented by foregone female earnings. By contrast, quality-dependent child
costs are represented by total educational expenditure etnt on the right-hand side of Equation
(2).
The impact of health on productivity and therefore on earnings can be understood in two
ways: First, ξm and ξf may represent health-dependent labor participation in the sense that
only healthy time can be used for productive employment. According to WHO data (WHO,
2016), we obtain ξf = 0.8692 and ξm = 0.88337. Furthermore, case-study evidence indicates
that the economic burden of disease (in terms of labor lost) at the household level primarily
falls on women (cf. Bonilla and Rodriguez, 1993). We make the additional assumptions that
child care has to be provided and that this can be done regardless of the parental health status.8
Given that child care is provided unconditionally, this implies that the available working time
is 1− ψnt, of which a share ξf is used effectively, whereas a share 1− ξf is lost.9
Second, ξm and ξf may represent productivity at the work place, implying that (effective)
wage rates are now given by ξjŵt, whereas male and female participation are given by 1 and
1 − ψnt, respectively. Indeed, ample evidence shows that individual productivity increases
with health.10 While our analysis does not rely on a priori assumptions about the ordering
8This, obviously, rules out from our consideration very severe diseases. While we recognize that some acute
infectious diseases may, indeed, debilitate women to the extent they cannot provide child care, several important
chronic conditions (anemia, nonfatal malaria, cataract) are such that they are likely to depress female labor
supply but not their ability to provide (at least basic) child care.
9One could argue that the provision of child care has negative utility for a woman who is sick. It can be checked
that adding a term −φ (1− ξf )ψnt for φ ≥ 0 to the utility function does not change our results qualitatively if
φ is not too large.
10See for example Strauss and Thomas (1998), Schultz (2002, 2005), Shastry and Weil (2003), Bleakley (2007,
2010, 2011), Weil (2007), and Fink and Masiye (2012). The effects also include health impacts during childhood
that reflect on adult productivity. Recent work by Bleakley (2007, 2010) identifies strong direct effects on adult
productivity from childhood exposure to hookworms and malaria, respectively. Notably, productivity increases
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of ξm and ξf , the literature on the male-female health gap suggests that ξm ≥ ξf . Lower
female productivity may arise, for instance, due to iodine deficiency, a problem encountered
in many developing countries, in particular in Sub-Saharan Africa. As Field et al. (2009) find
from microeconometric evidence, insufficient iodine intake during pregnancy lowers children’s
cognitive ability and subsequent educational attainment, in particular for girls. Notably this
is true even when girls and boys receive the same amount of schooling. In this context, ξm −
ξf > 0 could be interpreted as the extent to which maternal iodine deficiency impairs female
productivity for a given quantity of education ht (as would arise from educational spending et).
For fertility to be nonnegative and not to exceed the amount that would induce females
to spend more time on child care than their available time budget allows, we assume that
γ ∈ (δ, ξf/ξm) holds. Solving the couple’s utility maximization problem then yields optimal
consumption
ct =
(ξm + ξf )ŵt
1 + γ
, (3)
while optimal fertility and optimal human capital investments are given by
nt =

γ(ξm+ξf )
ξfψ(1+γ)
for ŵt ≤ γe¯δξfψ ,
(γ−δ)(ξm+ξf )ŵt
(1+γ)(ξfψŵt−e¯) otherwise,
(4)
et =

0 for ŵt ≤ γe¯δξfψ ,
δξfψŵt−γe¯
γ−δ otherwise.
(5)
At low levels of wages, ŵt ≤ γe¯/(δξfψ), the couple divides household income between consump-
tion ct and fertility nt alone, while educational investments et are zero. The reason is that
parents prefer a corner solution in which children only learn incidentally because income is so
low that the marginal utility from consumption and fertility outweighs the marginal benefit
from educational investments over and above the basic level. However, once wages surpass the
threshold ŵt = γe¯/(δξfψ), investing in their children’s education such that et turns positive
becomes optimal for parents (cf. Strulik et al., 2013). Notably, the threshold depends on female
health alone. By raising the opportunity cost of child care, improved female health tends to
skew the quality-quantity trade-off toward educational investments rather than the number of
even for a given level of schooling. As Bleakley (2011) argues, better child health tends to raise, as a first-order
effect, the quality of a given quantity of education, whereas ensuing (optimal) changes to the quantity of education
only give rise to second-order effects.
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children.
For increasing income and human capital, the model replicates a transition from high to low
fertility, that is, fertility converges from above to
lim
ŵt→∞
nt =
(γ − δ)(ξm + ξf )
(1 + γ)ξfψ
<
γ(ξm + ξf )
ξfψ(1 + γ)
, (6)
where the right-hand side represents fertility in the low-growth regime. Furthermore, as in-
specting Equation (5) shows, once the income threshold for positive educational investments is
surpassed, these investments rise with income, paving the way for mass education (cf. Galor,
2005, 2011; Strulik et al., 2013). With regard to the impact of gender-specific health on the
household allocation we can now state the following11:
Proposition 1. Given the level of earnings, ŵt,
(i) consumption increases (symmetrically) with male (ξm) and female (ξf ) health;
(ii) fertility increases (decreases) with male (female) health both in the low-growth and in the
modern growth regime and in the long-run limit; and
(iii) educational investments in the modern growth regime increase with female health and are
unaffected by male health.
Proof. Immediate from differentiation of (4), (5), and (6) with respect to ξf and ξm.
Improvements in male health yield an income effect that unambiguously leads to an expan-
sion of both consumption and the number of children. By contrast, female health improvements
yield both an income and a substitution effect. The income effect leads again to an unambiguous
expansion of consumption, but this is no longer true with regard to the number of children. Here,
the substitution effect, driven by the greater opportunity cost of children, leads to a reduction in
the number of children. While this is true even in the low-growth regime, in the modern growth
regime the reduction in fertility comes with greater educational investments. The effect that
rising male income leads to higher fertility, while rising female income leads to lower fertility
is well established empirically (cf. Butz and Ward, 1979; Schultz, 1985; Heckman and Walker,
1990; Bloom et al., 2009). Furthermore, Bratti and Mendola (2014) provide evidence that a
11Note that we operate under the assumption that the costs of health interventions are borne by foreign govern-
ments or development agencies and that no cost differentials exist between male and female health interventions.
See Subsection 6.2 for an extension in which the household undertakes health investments.
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negative health shock to the mother reduces the educational enrollment of children, whereas
a negative health shock to the father does not. Note that i) spillover effects of female health
on the human capital levels of other household members would only strengthen our results and
that ii) all our subsequent derivations hold true irrespective of whether the chosen fertility level
is above or below the replacement rate.
2.2 Population development and labor force participation
Because each couple gives birth to nt children at time t, the replacement rate of fertility is given
by nt = 2 and the adult population evolves according to
Nt+1 =
nt
2
Nt. (7)
As far as labor market participation is concerned, we abstract from leisure and assume that
individuals inelastically supply their available time net of child rearing. While interpreting ξm
and ξf as health-dependent participation or as health-dependent productivity does not make any
difference to the household analysis and will not make a difference to the key macroeconomic
relationships summarized in the system of Equations (22)-(29), the subsequent intermediate
analysis of employment in terms of workers (Lt) is based on the interpretation of ξm and ξf as
health-dependent labor participation. Note that for this case human capital ht is homogeneous
across gender so that the wage rate, ŵt, is gender neutral, while labor supply
Lt =
Nt
2
[ξm + ξf (1− ψnt)] (8)
depends on health in addition to the time that women allocate to child care.
Remark 1. The productivity interpretation of ξm and ξf implies that the level of human capital
ξjht is gender specific. Hence, (i) the wage rate ξjŵt is now gender specific, and (ii) labor
demand and employment in terms of workers (Lt) will now depend on the gender composition,
whereas (iii) labor supply in terms of workers is no longer health dependent. In this case, one
would have to write out Equations (8), (10), (11), (14)-(16), and (18) in terms of aggregate
human capital (Ht). Doing so, one can easily derive wages and earnings as (19) and (20) and
the dynamic system (22)-(29), all of which apply regardless of the particular interpretation of
ξm and ξf .
11
2.3 Education sector
Once the income threshold for positive educational investments is surpassed, aggregate spending
on formal education is given by education expenditures per couple (etnt) multiplied by the
number of couples (Nt/2), thus amounting to
etnt
Nt
2
=
δξfψŵt − γe¯
ξfψŵt − e¯ ·
(ξm + ξf )ŵt
1 + γ
· Nt
2
. (9)
Aggregate education spending is then used to employ Lt,E teachers whose aggregate wage bill
is given by ŵtLt,E . Thus, we can derive the equilibrium number of teachers as
Lt,E =
etnt
ŵt
· Nt
2
=
δξfψŵt − γe¯
ξfψŵt − e¯ ·
ξm + ξf
1 + γ
· Nt
2
. (10)
These teachers produce the human capital level of the next generation with a teaching produc-
tivity per unit of human capital of η. Because the human capital level of teachers is ht and
educational resources devoted to each child are given by Lt,E/Nt+1 with Nt+1 = ntNt/2, we
have the following equation of motion for individual human capital,
ht+1 =

e¯ for ŵt ≤ γe¯δξfψ ,
ηhtLt,E
ntNt/2
+ e¯ = ηetwt + e¯ =
ηδξfψŵt−γe¯
(γ−δ)wt + e¯ otherwise.
(11)
In the infinite limit, the growth factor of human capital converges to
lim
ht→∞
ht+1
ht
=
ηδξfψ
γ − δ (12)
for rising levels of human capital.12 The following result is immediate.
Proposition 2. The long-run growth factor of human capital increases with female health but
is unrelated to male health.
The intuitive explanation is that for increasing male income the income and substitution
effects with respect to fertility cancel out, while, for increasing female income the substitution
effect dominates. This implies that rising male productivity due to improvements in health
leave fertility and education investments unchanged, while rising female productivity due to
12Note from Equation (15) that limht→∞ ŵt =∞.
12
health improvements reduce fertility and raise education investments.13
2.4 Production sector
We follow Galor and Weil (2000) and assume that the production technology is given by
Yt = H
α
t,Y (AtX)
1−α , (13)
where Ht,Y = htLt,Y refers to aggregate human capital employed in production, with Lt,Y
being the number of workers; At ≥ 1 denoting the stock of technologies that a country has
at its disposal; X denoting natural resources of fixed supply; and α denoting the elasticity of
output with respect to human capital. This production function implies, ceteris paribus, that
an increase in human capital employed in goods production and an increase in the technological
sophistication of a country both raise output. Following Galor and Weil (2000) and assuming
that no property rights are defined on the fixed resource X (such that its return is zero), gives
the wage per unit of human capital as the average product of human capital, that is,
wt =
Yt
Ht,Y
=
(
AtX
htLt,Y
)1−α
. (14)
The wage rate (per unit of time) is then given by
ŵt = htwt = h
α
t
(
AtX
Lt,Y
)1−α
, (15)
which declines with labor supply and increases with human capital. To summarize, effective
labor has three dimensions in our setting: (i) productivity, which is determined by technology
and captured by the variable At; (ii) human capital, which is determined by the parental
education decision and captured by the variable ht; and (iii) the available healthy time of men
and women, which is given by the parameters ξm and ξf , respectively.
13Note that this effect would also be present if men spent time on childcare as long as they spend less on
childcare then women.
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2.5 Market clearing
Labor market clearing requires that labor is either employed in goods production or in the
education sector such that Lt = Lt,E + Lt,Y , from which we obtain
Lt,Y =
Nt
2
[
ξm + ξf (1− ψnt)− etnt
ŵt
]
, (16)
where the second term in square brackets adjusts female labor supply for productivity and
child rearing and the third term in square brackets refers to employment in the education
sector. Following Walras’ Law, we can also determine the amount of human capital employed in
production by recognizing that production of final goods has to equal aggregate consumption,
that is, goods markets are cleared. Hence, production per capita yt = Yt/Nt has to equal
consumption per capita such that
yt =
ct
2
=
(ξm + ξf )ŵt
2(1 + γ)
. (17)
Because wt = Yt/Ht,Y = yt/(Ht,Y /Nt), we obtain the following expressions for human capital
and labor employment in final goods production
Ht,Y =
(ξm + ξf )ht
2(1 + γ)
Nt ⇒ Lt,Y = ξm + ξf
2(1 + γ)
Nt. (18)
The expression for Lt,Y can be verified by substituting the optimal values of et and nt into
Equation (16) and simplifying the expression. Using Equations (14) and (15), we can recalculate
wages per unit of human capital and per unit of time as
wt =
[
2(1 + γ)AtX
ht (ξm + ξf )Nt
]1−α
, (19)
⇔ ŵt = hαt
[
2(1 + γ)AtX
(ξm + ξf )Nt
]1−α
. (20)
2.6 International technology diffusion
In specifying the diffusion of technologies from countries that are advancing the world techno-
logical frontier we follow Benhabib and Spiegel (2005), p. 941, and assume that
At+1 = max
{
ht
h¯t
(
A¯t
At
− 1
)
At +At, A¯t
}
, (21)
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where A¯t and h¯t refer to the technological frontier and the human capital level in the most
advanced countries, respectively. The larger the technological gap between more and less de-
veloped countries, the faster is the process of technology diffusion (cf. Howitt, 2000; Acemoglu
et al., 2006). This can be justified by the notion that adopting new technologies is more likely
to pay off the larger the additional amount of output that can be produced by using them. Fur-
thermore, the gap between the average human capital of the less developed country and that
of the technology leaders, ht/h¯t, acts as a technology adoption barrier (cf. Nelson and Phelps,
1966; Parente and Prescott, 1994).14
3 Dynamic behavior of the economy in general equilibrium
Combining our building blocks, we obtain the following dynamic system that describes our
model economy in the low-growth regime:
At+1 =
ht
h¯t
(
A¯t
At
− 1
)
At +At, (22)
ht+1 = e¯, (23)
Nt+1 =
γ(ξm + ξf )
2ξfψ(1 + γ)
Nt, (24)
wt+1 =
[
2(1 + γ)At+1X
(ξm + ξf )ht+1Nt+1
]1−α
, (25)
while the modern growth regime is characterized by
At+1 =
ht
h¯t
(
A¯t
At
− 1
)
At +At, (26)
ht+1 =
ηδξfψŵt − γe¯
(γ − δ)wt + e¯, (27)
Nt+1 =
(γ − δ)(ξm + ξf )ŵt
2(1 + γ)(ξfψŵt − e¯)Nt, (28)
wt+1 =
[
2(1 + γ)At+1X
(ξm + ξf )ht+1Nt+1
]1−α
. (29)
14In case that education levels converge between less developed and developed countries, technological levels
would also converge. In this case the less developed country would also become a technology leader in the very
long run.
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Note that the low-growth regime represents a locally stable steady-state equilibrium in which
an economy is caught and cannot escape without technological progress that it imports from
the rest of the world. In this sense the latent state variable that eventually induces a take-off
is the stock of technologies in rich countries (cf. Galor and Weil, 2000, where the latent state
variable is the population size). Consider now the development of the economy from some time
t0 onward, assuming that at t0 the economy is in the low-growth regime. Specifically, we then
have
ht0 = e¯; nt0 =
γ(ξm + ξf )
ξfψ(1 + γ)
; et0 = 0; wt0 =
[
2(1 + γ)At0X
(ξm + ξf )e¯Nt0
]1−α
<
γ
δξfψ
,
where the inequality implies ŵt0 < γe¯/(δξfψ) and thus fertility is high and no education in-
vestments are undertaken. One sufficient condition for sustained economic development is the
ongoing growth of wages due to international knowledge diffusion. Using Equation (20) we can
calculate the growth rate of wages as
gt :=
ŵt+1
ŵt
− 1 =
(
ht+1
ht
)α(At+1/At
nt/2
)1−α
− 1, (30)
where At+1/At = max
{
ht/ht
(
At/At − 1
)
+ 1, 1
}
. It is sufficient for sustained wage growth
(gt > 0) that ht+1/ht ≥ 1, i.e., human capital is nondecreasing, and At+1/At ≥ nt/2, i.e.,
technological progress does not fall short of population growth, implying that the wage rate
is nondecreasing. We can then derive the following more specific sufficient conditions for a
transition from low growth to modern growth and for sustained economic growth in the very
long run.
Proposition 3. The following holds for the occurrence of a transition and for its sustainability,
respectively:
(i) A transition from low growth to modern growth arises if
At+1
At
>
γ(ξm + ξf )
2ξfψ(1 + γ)
, (31)
with At+1/At = max
{
et/ht
(
At/At − 1
)
+ 1, 1
}
up until the point of transition.
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(ii) Sustained economic development in the very long run arises if
ln
(
ηδξfψ
γ − δ
)
≥ 1− α
α
ln
[
(γ − δ)(ξm + ξf )
2(1 + γ)ξfψ
]
. (32)
Proof. See Appendix A.
Within the low-growth regime the wage rate can only increase through a rising “base-
line” wage per unit of human capital. This requires that technological progress At+1/At out-
weighs population growth nt/2 under high fertility. Given that, realistically, nt/2 > 1 in these
economies, this requires that technological growth is positive and sufficiently strong as by con-
dition (31). Assuming that technological growth abates in the very long run, wages continue
to increase unambiguously if human capital continues to outgrow the population by a sufficient
amount. Thus, considering the long-run limits of human capital growth given in Equation (12)
and fertility given in Equation (6), we find the sufficient condition (32) for sustained long-run
growth.15
We can now identify the role of female health in sustained growth and in a transition to
a modern growth regime. To this end, assume that the transition takes place at τ ≥ t0 + 1
and that technology growth At+1/At ' Â is roughly constant over the interval [t0, τ ] . Defining
ŵτ = γe¯/(δξfψ) as the wage level at which the transition occurs and combining this with the
initial wage level
ŵt0 = e¯
α
[
2(1 + γ)At0X
(ξm + ξf )Nt0
]1−α
(33)
and with the growth rate in the low-growth regime
g =
[
2Â(1 + γ)ξfψ
γ(ξm + ξf )
]1−α
− 1, (34)
we can use the relationship ŵτ = (1 + g)
τ−t0 ŵt0 to solve for the time to transition as a function
of ξf and ξm
∆ = τ − t0 = ln ŵτ − ln ŵt0
ln (1 + g)
.
15For a precipitous exogenous fall in the rate of technological progress immediately after the transition to the
sustained growth regime, a fall back to the low-growth regime cannot be entirely ruled out. A closer investigation
of this rather unrealistic case is available from the authors upon request.
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We then obtain
∂∆
∂ξf
=
1
ξf ln (1 + g)
[
−1 + (1− α) ξf
ξm + ξf
− (1− α) ∆ ξm
ξm + ξf
]
< 0, (35)
∂∆
∂ξm
=
(1− α) (1 + ∆)
(ξm + ξf ) ln (1 + g)
> 0, (36)
which allows us to state our main result.
Proposition 4. Better female (male) health, that is, a higher ξf (ξm)
(i) leads to faster (slower) wage growth in the low-growth regime and in the long-run limit
and
(ii) speeds up (slows down) the transition to modern growth.
Proof. Part (i) follows immediately when inserting the low-growth and limiting values of nt
[cf. Equations (4) and (6)] and the limiting value of ht+1/ht [cf. Equation (12)] into (30) and
taking the appropriate derivatives with respect to ξf and ξm. Part (ii) follows immediately from
Equations (35) and (36).
Economies with better female health tend to experience faster wage growth during the low-
growth regime and in the long-run limit. This is because they tend to exhibit less downward
pressure on the wage rate for an expanding population and greater accumulation of human
capital in the modern growth regime. While greater wage growth in the low-growth regime
suggests that economic transition is taking place earlier, this is not a foregone conclusion. The
reason is that while wages grow faster within economies with healthy females [the last term
in (35)] and while these economies enter the transition at a lower wage level [the first term in
brackets in (35)], they are also starting at a lower wage level [the second term in (35)]. This is
because greater female labor participation (or productivity) initially tends to depress wages. As
it turns out, the economy with a healthier (and more productive) female labor force experiences
economic take-off at an earlier time. We note from (35) that the impact of female health on
the speed to transition decreases with the growth rate on the path to transition and increases
with the time to transition. Finally, we note that the reduction in the transition threshold is a
crucial factor. This is because when the time to transition is short, the impact of lower fertility
on the growth rate is insufficient to offset the initial reduction in the wage rate.
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All of this contrasts with the impact of male health which, by raising fertility, tends to slow
the pace economic development. This is consistent with the empirical evidence provided by
Schultz (1985) and Heckman and Walker (1990), which both show that fertility increases with
male income. Indeed, male health impedes economic transition by lowering both the initial level
of wages and its growth rate.
We show in Section 6 that our results are robust to extensions of the model taking account
of collective household preferences, endogenous health investments, and physical capital in the
production process.
4 Policy applications
From a development policy perspective, our main result in Proposition 4 implies that efforts
toward health improvements should be targeted at women. Indeed, the model suggests that
redistributing health from men to women may be beneficial. The following result shows, how-
ever, that such a policy would create a conflict with the interests of the unitary household in
the short run. This argument abstracts from the justification of the redistribution of healthcare
opportunities to women based on an unequal distribution biased against women to begin with
(cf. the literature referenced in the introduction).
Proposition 5. Consider a redistribution of health from men to women such that dξf = −dξm >
0.
(i) Such a policy unambiguously raises economic growth rates throughout and speeds up the
economic transition, but
(ii) for any given wage, ŵt, it unambiguously lowers household utility, both in the low-growth
and in the modern growth regime.
Proof. See Appendix A.
Thus, while enhancing economic growth and hastening economic transition, a redistribution
of health also lowers household utility. This is true even when such a policy fosters educa-
tional investments in the modern growth regime or induces a transition. Indeed, this follows
from a revealed preference argument: Noting from the budget constraint in Equation (2) that
redistribution unambiguously lowers family income, it must be true that the household with
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better male health could always mimic the allocation chosen by a household with better female
health and thereby do at least as well. Any deviation in the allocation (i.e., the choice of more
children) must then be associated with even greater utility. We realize that this result depends
on the assumption of unitary household decision making and may well change in the presence
of collective decision-making. This notwithstanding, it highlights the scope for a conflict be-
tween the short-term interests of utility-maximizing households, which may favor male health
improvements, and the long-term interests of development policies that favor female health
improvements.
In many instances, health policies are not targeted at particular individuals within the house-
hold. One may wonder then what the implications are for the pace of economic development if
women and men both benefit equally from a particular health policy.
Proposition 6. Consider an increase in the health of both sexes by a common factor λ > 1.
Such a policy
(i) leaves the growth rate unaffected in the low-growth regime and raises the growth rate in
the long-run limit and
(ii) speeds up the economic transition.
Proof. See Appendix A.
Given the opposing effects of male and female health on growth and development it is unclear
a priori whether health improvements that affect both sexes alike promote development. Indeed,
to some extent this depends on the economic regime itself. While a proportional increase
in the health of both males and females promotes growth by lowering fertility and raising
education in the modern growth regime, this is not true in the low-growth regime. In the
absence of educational investments, proportional health improvements do not reduce fertility
and thereby leave the growth rate unaffected. This result echoes the finding of Cervellati
and Sunde (2011) that the impact of health on economic growth depends on whether the
demographic transition has occurred or not. According to their analysis, health improvements,
as measured by increases in life expectancy, tend to reduce fertility after the demographic
transition to the extent that population growth slows down and per capita income growth
increases. Before the transition, however, health improvements raise life expectancy but do not
reduce fertility, which may even increase slightly. Consequently, population growth increases,
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which in turn compromises per capita income growth. Although the health effects in our
model work through morbidity/productivity rather than mortality/life expectancy, the impact
is very similar: In the presence of a quality-quantity trade-off, female health improvements raise
educational investments, and the ensuing increase in the cost of child care is enough to offset the
positive income effect of male health on fertility, which is unambiguously reduced. By contrast,
before the transition, the income effect, calling for an increase in fertility, exactly cancels the
effect from greater female opportunity cost. Whether fertility increases or decreases ultimately
depends on the distribution of health gains in the household. Thus, it is easy to conceive that if
males benefit to a larger extent, fertility does, indeed, increase. What our analysis also shows is
that health improvements common to men and women do, however, facilitate a take-off toward
sustained economic development, albeit more slowly.
5 Numerical analysis
We now illustrate the analytical results with a numerical example based on a parametrization
for Sub-Saharan Africa (year 2012), as given in Table 1. Specifically, we consider two exercises:
First, we examine the impact of gender-specific health on the time to transition, seeking to assess
the size of the effect; second, we solve the dynamic system as given by Equations (22) to (29)
numerically, seeking to assess the impact of gender-specific health on the overall development
process.
To proxy the impact of health on labor participation, we use data from WHO (2016) on the
years of healthy life lost due to disability (YLD) for Sub-Saharan Africa. Assuming that the life-
span in which women face a trade-off between participating in the labor force and child-rearing
stretches from age 15 to age 50,16 we employ the age-gender specific values Y LDf,15−29 =
0.10545, Y LDf,30−49 = 0.149821, Y LDm,15−29 = 0.093425, and Y LDm,30−49 = 0.134035 to
calculate
ξj =
15× (1− Y LDj,15−29) + 20× (1− Y LDj,30−49)
35
for j = f,m. We then obtain ξf = 0.8692 and ξm = 0.88337 as the gender-specific shares of
the 35 year’s life-span between ages 15 and 50 that individuals spend in good health. The
parameters δ, γ, and ψ, capturing preferences for education, the number of children, and the
16This reflects the notion that women give birth approximately during the age-interval 15-35 years and that
children require care up to age 15.
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time cost of children, respectively, have been chosen to match the total fertility rate [Equation
(4)], female labor force participation, ξf (1− ψnt), for Sub-Saharan Africa in the year 2012, and
an asymptotic fertility rate [Equation (6)] at the replacement level of 2 (reflecting a balanced
sex ratio at birth and the absence of mortality). Using the calibrated values, we then set the
parameter η so as to induce the long-run stationarity of human capital according to Equation
(12). Finally, we set α = 2/3 such that the long-run share of national income going to the
production factor labor is roughly in line with the data and we normalize e = 1. Consistent
with the data on which we base our numerical example, we assume a period length of 35 years.
Regarding the levels and growth rates of foreign human capital and technology we assume values
that guarantee a takeoff toward the modern growth regime in the late 20th Century.
We use these values for the baseline scenario and then assess the impact of a 5 percent
increase in female health, as measured by the share of healthy time, in Scenario 1. Similarly,
we consider a 5 percent increase in male health in Scenario 2, and a 5 percent increase in the
health of both sexes in Scenario 3. Note that a 5 percent increase in female health amounts to
a reduction of the (average) time of 48 days per year spent in disability by some 16 days.
Table 1: Parameter values for simulation
Parameter Value Parameter Value
δ 0.08715 α 2/3
γ 0.14322 gh (foreign) 0.00% p.a.
ψ 0.04945 gA (foreign) 3.67% p.a.
ξf 0.86920 ξm 0.88337
e¯ 1.000 η 14.9700
period length t 35 yrs.
Table 2 presents for the baseline case and the three scenarios the pretransition outcomes in
terms of fertility, female labor force participation, economic growth, and the time to transition.
According to World Bank (2016) data for Sub-Saharan Africa in 2012, fertility is around 5.1
children per household, and female labor force participation amounts to 0.64964. Annual growth
(averaged over the time span 1961 to 2012) is on the order of 0.789% and amounts to an almost
stagnating economy.17 We assign a stock of land X such that the baseline economy reaches
transition after 75 years, corresponding to the third model period.
17We assume for this experiment constant technology adoption of about 5.2% per year. In our subsequent
numerical experiment, technology adoption is specified according to the flexible form of Equation (21), giving
rise to an average on the same order.
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The five percent improvement in female health (Scenario 1) leads to a reduction in fertility
of 2.4 percent and to an increase in female labor participation of about 5.9 percent. As a
consequence, the time to transition is reduced by 7 years and 2 months, which is enough to
trigger a transition after two rather than three periods as in the baseline. By contrast, a five
percent increase in male health (Scenario 2) raises the time to transition by 3 years and 5
months. Given our assumption of a period length of 35 years, this does not have a bearing on
the simulated transition process (see below). Finally, a five percent improvement in the health
of both sexes reduces the time to transition by 4 years and 2 months, which again is not enough
to induce an earlier transition in the numerical example.
A period length of 35 years leads to rather extreme impacts of changes in health on the
transition process as it is modeled. Relatively small differences in the latent time to transition
(as for example the 3 years difference when comparing Scenarios 1 and 3) may either trigger no
effect (as for Scenario 3) or a change in the timing of transition by 35 years (as for Scenario 1).
In that regard, changes in the latent time to transition are a more realistic measure of the likely
impact of health on the transition process. Moreover, a long period length is associated with a
second problem: whether or not a health improvement advances or delays economic transition
(by a generation) is very sensitive to the level of the initial wage ŵt0 and therefore depends
crucially on the assumptions about the initial state of the economy.
In light of these concerns we can arrive at a more robust statement about the role of health for
economic take-off by considering the following stochastic setting. Suppose the initial conditions
of the economy {At0 , Nt0 , X} are randomly drawn from a set of values G so that they generate
an initial wage ŵbt0 ∈
[
wb, wb
]
for which transition arises after three periods (and three periods
only) in the baseline scenario (b).18 Clearly, the range of initial wages
[
w1, w1
]
for which
transition arises after 3 periods in Scenario 1 satisfies w1 < wb and w1 < wb (i.e., the range is
shifted “downward”). Intuitively this is due to the fact that better female health reduces the
threshold wage for economic take-off.
Furthermore, for any given {At0 , Nt0 , X} ∈ G, the initial wage in Scenario 1 will satisfy
ŵ1t0 ∈
[(
ŵ1t0/ŵ
b
t0
)
wb,
(
ŵ1t0/ŵ
b
t0
)
wb
]
with ŵ1t0/ŵ
b
t0 < 1. This is because of the greater effective
labor supply associated with better female health in Scenario 1. Nevertheless, an interval
18More specifically, wb := γe/
[
δψξbf
(
1 + gb
)3]
and wb := γe/
[
δψξbf
(
1 + gb
)2]
with gb as defined by Equation
(34). Thus, the lower (upper) bound corresponds to the baseline threshold wage discounted by the growth over
three (two) periods. If ŵbt0 < w
b, the transition would occur after four periods; if ŵbt0 > w
b, the transition would
occur after two periods.
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exists
[
w1,
(
ŵ1t0/ŵ
b
t0
)
wb
]
such that a draw ŵ1t0 ∈
[
w1,
(
ŵ1t0/ŵ
b
t0
)
wb
]
will induce a transition
after three periods in the baseline case but a transition after two periods in Scenario 1. The
probability of such a draw, pib1 =
[(
ŵ1t0/ŵ
b
t0
)
wb − w1] [(ŵ1t0/ŵbt0) (wb − wb)]−1 , can now be
read as the probability that the improvement in female health in Scenario 1 advances the
economic transition by one period (i.e., by 35 years). For our numerical example we obtain
pib1 = 0.188, which is of sizable magnitude.
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Table 2: Impact of health on pretransition outcomes and time to take-off
Baseline Scenario 1 Scenario 2 Scenario 3
Health parameters
ξf 0.86920 0.91266 0.86920 0.91266
ξm 0.88337 0.88337 0.92754 0.92754
Pretransition outcomes
Fertility n 5.1081 4.9855 5.2369 5.1081
Participation ξf (1− ψn) 0.64964 0.68766 0.64411 0.68212
yearly growth rate g 0.00789 0.00812 0.00765 0.00789
Time to transition (yrs.) 75 67.834 78.421 70.861
Yrs. gained on baseline − 7.166 −3.421 4.139
In our second exercise, we graph the development paths for human capital, population,
and income, embracing both pre- and post-transition periods. The impact of female health
improvements is shown in Figure 1. The solid blue line refers to the baseline case, whereas the
dashed red line refers to Scenario 1, i.e., an economy that experienced at the initial time (1900)
a 5 percent increase in female healthy time.
Both economies start with the same population size, the same state of technology, and
the same land endowment. They follow the same path until around the year 1970 when they
are still in a low-growth regime without the accumulation of human capital [see panel b)] and
very sluggish income growth [see panel f)]. The sole reason that wages grow at all is that the
technological frontier in the rest of the world grows at a constant rate such that the distance to
the frontier increases, leading to more intense technology adoption (cf. Howitt, 2000; Acemoglu
et al., 2006). At the point of take-off (for the baseline scenario this is the year 2005 and for
19Similarly, we obtain pib3 = 0.116 as the probability that an equiproportional increase of health for both
genders advances economic take-off by one generation, and (in an analogous way) we obtain pib2 = 0.114 as the
probability that an improvement in male health delays take-off by one generation.
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Figure 1: Illustration of the differential take-off in Scenario 1. The baseline simulation is
reflected by the solid blue line. The dashed red line refers to a simulation with similar parameter
values except that female health increases by 5 percent as compared with the baseline simulation.
Scenario 1 this is the year 1970), per capita income surpasses the value at which it becomes
optimal for individuals to invest in the education of their offspring. From then on parents
choose to have fewer children but to educate them better. Consequently, a fertility transition
sets in and the rate of population growth declines [see panel d)]. The resulting increase in
human capital helps to close the gap between the human capital level of the country under
consideration and the rest of the world. This in turn leads to faster technology adoption and
an increase of per capita income growth [see panels e) and f)].
In comparison with the baseline scenario we see that the benefits from female health im-
provements materialize only over time, but then in an accelerating way. This is due to diverging
growth rates of human capital and income in the modern growth regime, implying that an ini-
tial advantage is magnified. Interestingly, little perceivable difference exists between the two
economies in the “immediate” aftermath of the early transition (i.e., over the years 1970–2005).
Thus, female health improvements appear to create only a small initial advantage in terms of
slightly higher growth rates at a slightly earlier point in time, but this effect is vastly magnified
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Figure 2: Illustration of the differential take-off in Scenario 2. The baseline simulation is
reflected by the solid blue line. The dashed red line refers to a simulation with similar parameter
values except that male health increases by 5 percent point as compared with the baseline
simulation.
over the subsequent 70 years.
In Figure 2 we hold female health constant and simulate an increase in male health by 5
percent (Scenario 2). In this case, both economies take off in the year 2005. Nevertheless, even
under the modern growth regime, the higher fertility level in Scenario 2 places a drag on income
growth and the growth of human capital, causing these economies to also diverge (slightly).
Finally, in Figure 3, we present the results of an equiproportional increase in health of both
sexes (Scenario 3). Both economies experience the take-off in the year 2005 and the difference in
post-transition growth rates is rather limited. This implies that these economies do not follow
dramatically divergent development paths.
We should mention that the path of development is not invariant to the sequencing of events.
If female health is improved earlier (later) than male health, the economy ends up on a higher
(lower) income trajectory. This suggests that targeted health interventions for women are more
effective for economic development the earlier they occur, conferring substantial cumulative
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Figure 3: Illustration of the differential take-off in Scenario 3. The baseline simulation is
reflected by the solid blue line. The dashed red line refers to a simulation with similar parameter
values except that health increases equiproportionally by 5 percent point for males and females
as compared with the baseline simulation.
benefits that would not be realized if intervention was delayed.
6 Extensions and robustness of the results
In this section we investigate three extensions of the model and analyze whether our results
are robust to these alternative specifications. Subsection 6.1 relaxes the assumption of unitary
household preferences in favor of collective preferences, Subsection 6.2 analyzes the implications
of endogenous investments in health, and Subsection 6.3 sheds light on the effects of physical
capital accumulation and foreign direct investment (FDI).
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6.1 Collective household preferences
Frequent arguments hold that household allocations are (empirically) better represented by
models of collective rather than unitary preferences.20 To illustrate the robustness of our main
results, this section derives the allocation under collective household preferences and sketches
out the implications of (female) health improvements. Thus, consider collective preferences of
the form
u = θ̂ [log (cmt ) + γm log (nt) + δm log (e¯+ et)]
+
(
1− θ̂
) [
log
(
cft
)
+ γf log (nt) + δf log (e¯+ et)
]
, (37)
according to which each partner j = m, f derives utility from private consumption cjt and
from the number of children and their education, the latter two being public goods within the
household. The distribution function of bargaining power θ̂ = θ (ξm, ξf ) is assumed to depend
on the distribution of health. This can be viewed as a reduced form of the more common
representation, in which θ̂ depends on the income distribution within the household. Naturally,
we have ∂θ/∂ξm = θm ≥ 0 ≥ θf = ∂θ/∂ξf , implying that better female (male) health tends to
increase (decrease) women’s bargaining power. We allow that partners differ in their preferences
over children and their education. Similar to Rees and Riezman (2012) we follow empirical
evidence that men tend to have a stronger preference for private consumption and the number
of children as opposed to education (see e.g. Schultz, 1990; Thomas, 1990) such that we assume
δm < δf ≤ γf ≤ γm. Solving the utility maximization problem subject to the original budget
constraint in Equation (2) we obtain
cmt =
θ̂(ξm + ξf )ŵt
1 + γ̂
; cft =
(
1− θ̂
)
(ξm + ξf )ŵt
1 + γ̂
(38)
20See Browning and Chiappori (1998) for a general characterization and de la Croix and Vander Donckt
(2010), Rees and Riezman (2012), and Prettner and Strulik (2016) for applications to the economic-demographic
transition.
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for male and female consumption and
nt =

γ̂(ξm+ξf )
ξfψ(1+γ̂)
for ŵt ≤ γ̂e¯
δ̂ξfψ
,
(γ̂−δ̂)(ξm+ξf )ŵt
(1+γ̂)(ξfψŵt−e¯) otherwise,
(39)
et =

0 for ŵt ≤ γ̂e¯
δ̂ξfψ
,
δξfψŵt−γ̂e¯
γ̂−δ̂ otherwise,
(40)
for fertility and education with γ̂ = θ̂γm +
(
1− θ̂
)
γf and δ̂ = θ̂δm +
(
1− θ̂
)
δf , respectively.
Thus, the allocation follows the same principles as for the unitary household, the only differences
being that (i) aggregate household consumption ct is now split according to the distribution rule
and (ii) fertility and education as household public goods now depend on the weighted sums γ̂
and δ̂ of individual preferences. Noting that sgn(∂γ̂/∂ξj) = sgn [(γm − γf ) θj ] = sgn(θj) and
sgn(∂δ̂/∂ξj) = [(δm − δf ) θj ] = −sgn(θj), deriving the following result is straightforward.
Proposition 7. Given the wage rate ŵt,
(i) aggregate consumption at the household level increases with female health (ξf ), but re-
sponds ambiguously to male health (ξm);
(ii) fertility increases (decreases) with male (female) health both in the low-growth and in the
modern growth regime and in the long-run limit;
(iii) educational investments in the modern growth regime increase (decrease) with female
(male) health;
(iv) the transition threshold decreases (increases) with female (male) health.
The direct impact of health on the household’s choices is now modified by the impact of
health on the household distribution of bargaining power. For female (male) health improve-
ments this implies that the preference weight on the number of children is reduced (increased),
whereas the weight on education is increased (reduced). In most cases this simply leads to a
reinforcement of the effects found for the unitary household model. In particular, female health
improvements tend to lower fertility and raise education (in the modern regime) both directly
and through the greater emphasis on education rather than the number of children in household
decision making. But two notable changes occur: First, male health improvements now have
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an ambiguous impact on household consumption. This is because the positive income effect is
offset by a greater emphasis on fertility. Second, in the modern growth regime, male health
now has a negative impact on education, because of the lower weight on education in household
decision making.
The implications for the process of economic development follow in a straightforward way.
Note first that the threshold for economic development [γ̂e¯/(δ̂ξfψ)] unambiguously decreases
with female health. This occurs both directly and indirectly through the shift in household
preferences toward the quality rather than the quantity of children. Furthermore, the economic
growth rates both in the low-growth and modern growth regimes increase with female health
due to the reduction in fertility. The converse applies to male health, where the transition
threshold itself now increases with male health. It then follows by analogy to Proposition 4
that improvements in female (male) health unambiguously hasten (slow) the process of economic
take-off.21
6.2 Endogenous health
Consider a setting in which male and female health depend on gender-specific investments in
health improvements. We conceptualize this by modifying the budget constraint to
ξm,tŵt + ξf,tŵt(1− ψnt) = ct + etnt − (im + if ), (41)
where health-dependent participation ξj,t = ξj + ξ̂j(ij,t) for j = f,m is now composed of an
exogenous part ξj and a part ξ̂j(ij,t) that is amenable to health investments ij,t. We also assume
ξ̂′j(ij,t) ≥ 0 and ξ̂′′j (ij,t) ≤ 0 for j = f,m.22 Maximizing utility as given by the original utility
function (1) subject to the budget constraint (41) we obtain household consumption as
ct =
(ξm,t + ξf,t)ŵt − im,t − if,t
1 + γ
, (42)
21A proof is available from the authors on request.
22Obviously, we need to impose ξj + ξ̂j(ij,t) ∈ [0, 1] for all ξj and ij,t. This is satisfied, for instance, for the
function ξ̂j(ij,t) = zjij,t/ (1 + ij,t) with ξj , zj ≥ 0 and ξj + zj ≤ 1.
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and fertility and education as, respectively,
nt =

γ(ξm,t+ξf,t)ŵt−im,t−if,t
ξf,tŵtψ(1+γ)
for ŵt ≤ γe¯δξf,tψ ,
(γ−δ)(ξm,t+ξf,t)ŵt−im,t−if,t
(1+γ)(ξf,tψŵt−e¯) otherwise,
(43)
et =

0 for ŵt ≤ γe¯δξf,tψ ,
δξf,tψŵt−γe¯
γ−δ otherwise.
(44)
In addition, we find the optimal health investments described by ξ̂′m(im,t)ŵt = 1 and ξ̂′f (if,t)ŵt(1−
ψnt) = 1, according to which the marginal return in terms of greater earnings is equilibrated
with the marginal unit of investment (=1). From the first-order conditions we obtain the fol-
lowing result.
Proposition 8. For a gender-neutral health production function ξ̂m(i) = ξ̂f (i), it is optimal for
the household to invest more in male health if nt > 0.
The result follows in a straightforward way as the returns to health investments in terms of
additional household earnings are greater for men than they are for women due to their lower
rate of labor participation. Notably, this finding provides a productivity-based explanation
for why women are discriminated against in terms of health investments (cf. the references in
footnote 4), i.e., it does not rely on a preference bias against women.
Consumption and fertility now depend on the optimal health investments in men and women,
while education depends on the optimal health investments in women. This additional channel
implies that, in contrast to the baseline model, the fertility rate now depends on the wage rate.
The same applies to the transition threshold, which depends on the wage rate through changes
in female health investments. The following can be shown:23
Lemma 1. (i) Male health investments increase with the wage rate, ∂im,t/∂ŵt > 0. (ii) Ceteris
paribus, female health investments decrease with fertility, ∂if,t/∂nt < 0, and increase with
the wage rate, ∂if,t/∂ŵt > 0. (iii) If γ < ξf,t/ξm,t, female health investments increase with
the wage rate when taking into account the optimal fertility response, dif,t/dŵt = ∂if,t/∂ŵt +
(∂if,t/∂nt) (dnt/dŵt) > 0.
While the positive impact of the wage rate on the incentive to invest in male health is
readily apparent, for women this is not entirely clear, because fertility itself now responds to
23Proofs of Lemma 1 and the subsequent Proposition 9 are available from the authors on request.
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wages and may, indeed, increase with the wage rate. This notwithstanding, it can be shown
that as long as women participate in the labor market (as is implied by γ < ξf,t/ξm,t), female
health investments respond positively to an increase in the wage rate.24
With these dependencies settled, it is straightforward to see that exogenous changes to
health essentially have the same impact on the household allocation and the process of economic
development as in the model without endogenous health investments. Consider an exogenous
increase in female health. While this has no impact on male health investments, the reduction
in fertility triggers complementary female health investments, dif,t/dξf > 0. Overall, this
magnifies the impact of female health on economic growth and the speed toward economic take-
off. However, by raising fertility, an exogenous increase in male health depresses female health
investments, dif,t/dξm < 0, implying even lower wage growth and a greater delay in reaching
transition.
We conclude this extension by noting that endogenous health investments tend to accelerate
or dampen the process toward economic transition. Thus, considering an economy that at time
t0 has not yet reached the point of economic take-off, i.e., ŵt0 < γe¯/(δξf,t0ψ), and defining
εt = ε (ξf,t, if,t) × ε (if,t, ŵt) as the product of the elasticity of female health with respect
to health investments, ε (ξf,t, if,t) = ξ̂
′
f if,t/ξf,t, and the (partial) elasticity of female health
investments with respect to the wage rate ε (if,t, ŵt) = (∂if,t/∂ŵt) (ŵt/if,t), we propose the
following.
Proposition 9. The following holds for the low-growth (pretransition) regime t ∈ [t0, τ ]:
(i) Fertility decreases with the wage rate if εt ≥ (im,t + if,t) /ct holds for t ∈ [t0, τ ] .
(ii) If this is true, then for any given Â = At+1/At > nt0/2, the economy accelerates toward
an earlier transition.
We only provide the intuition here (a formal proof is available upon request). According
to (i), the impact of a wage increase on fertility is ambiguous. This is unsurprising because
both male and female health investments increase with the wage rate. While the former drives
up fertility, the latter tends to depress it. If, and only if, the impact of the wage increase on
female health, as measured by the compound elasticity εt, is sufficiently strong, does fertility
24Note that the equilibrium wage is now only implicitly defined by ŵt =
hαt {2(1 + γ)ŵtAtX/Nt [(ξm,t + ξf,t) ŵt − (im,t + if,t)]}1−α . Verifying that this equation has a unique solu-
tion at ŵt ∈ (0, 1) is straightforward.
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decrease with the wage rate. This is more likely the lower aggregate health investments are
in relation to consumption. An underdeveloped economy for which technology growth exceeds
initial population growth such that wages grow at gt > 0 [cf. Equation (30)] will then accelerate
toward the point of take-off, τ . This is because health improvements (for males and females)
along the development path ultimately work toward a reduction in fertility, which in turn boosts
wage growth. In addition, the improvement in female health over time continues to lower the
transition threshold, implying a further advance of the time of take-off. Conversely, if female
health responds poorly to the wage rate, health improvements along the development path may
increase fertility and, thereby, slow the transition process.
It is worth mentioning at this point that this extension can be rewritten to cover gender-
specific educational investments instead of gender-specific health investments. In this case the
basic argument would not change.
It is often argued that utility itself depends on health (see for example Grossman, 1972;
Ehrlich and Chuma, 1990; Hall and Jones, 2007; Bloom et al., 2014b; Dalgaard and Strulik,
2014; Kuhn et al., 2015). We could capture some aspects of the utility-enhancing effect of health
investments by adding a term to the utility function that increases with the gender-specific
health levels. In the absence of cross-effects with the marginal utility of consumption, fertility,
and/or educational investments, this would have no impact on our results. The presence of
cross-effects in the utility function would, however, certainly complicate the interactions between
health investments and the other endogenous variables. While there is no reason to think that
it would change our central results, the explicit modeling of this would be complicated beyond
the point of analytical tractability.
6.3 Physical capital and FDI
We follow Galor and Weil (2000) in disregarding physical capital as an input in production
[cf. Equation (13)]. Indeed, we believe the assumption that most households do not hold
substantial amounts of wealth is reasonable for developing countries. While capital may play
a role in the production process, such capital is then predominantly owned either by a small
class of capitalists within the country or by foreign investors. Focusing on the latter, however,
shows an interesting relationship between (productivity-related) health improvements within a
developing economy and FDI.25
25Considering a fully-fledged multi-country open economy framework that allows for a detailed analysis of
capital and trade flows would complicate the model considerably. For the sake of clarity, we therefore restrict
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We can examine this in a straightforward way by considering a production function
Yt = H
α
t,Y (AtXt)
1−α ,
where Xt is now the supply of physical capital in period t.
26 Assuming that the price of capital is
equal to the world-market interest rate, r, and that inputs are paid according to their marginal
product, we then obtain immediately
Xt =
[
(1− α)A1−αt
r
] 1α
Ht,Y =
[
(1− α)A1−αt
r
] 1α
ht [ξm + ξf (1− ψnt)] Nt
2
as the stock of physical capital. Assuming for the sake of simplicity that capital does not
depreciate, we obtain a growth rate of capital equal to
gXt =
Xt+1
Xt
− 1 = Â 1−αα ht+1
ht
· nt
2
· ξm + ξf (1− ψnt+1)
ξm + ξf (1− ψnt) − 1.
For the case of pretransition growth, where ht+1 = ht = e and nt+1 = nt, these expressions
simplify to
Xt =
[
(1− α)A1−αt
r
] 1α γ(ξm + ξf )
1 + γ
Nt
2
,
gXt = Â
1−α
α
nt
2
= Â
1−α
α
γ(ξm + ξf )
2ξfψ(1 + γ)
.
The following is then easily verified.27
Proposition 10. For the low-growth (pretransition) regime t ∈ [t0, τ ], it holds that
(i) the level of capital (FDI) in each period increases with both female health (ξf ) and male
health (ξm);
(ii) the growth rate of capital (the growth rate of FDI), increases with male health, but decreases
with female health.
By increasing effective labor supply, better health, regardless of whether it is enjoyed by
ourselves to sketching out the main channels by which health might affect FDI flows in this section.
26We realize that this interpretation of our production function implies that technical change At is capital aug-
menting. However, for our purposes this is not a crucial assumption. In fact, any specification Yt = A
β
tH
α
t,YX
1−α
t
with β > 0 would lead to a similar outcome.
27Note that a low-growth regime obtains if the wage rate reported in Equation (45) is sufficiently low. This is
always true for At being sufficiently low.
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females or males, raises the marginal product of capital and, therefore, triggers a greater invest-
ment level. This result is consistent with the empirical findings of Alsan et al. (2006). Before
the transition, the growth rate of the capital stock is determined by the rate of technological
progress within a developing country and the rate of population growth. Thus, unsurprisingly,
the absolute rate of capital growth increases with male health but decreases with female health.
Given Â > 1, the same holds for the per capita rate of capital growth. Thus, in contrast to
many of our earlier findings, female health improvements compromise capital accumulation in
the pre-transition regime.
In a world in which the returns to capital do not contribute to the income of the population
under study (because they accrue abroad or to a population of negligible size) the measure to
focus on is the full wage rate, which in the model with capital is given by
ŵt = htwt = htα
[
(1− α)A1−αt
r
] 1−αα
. (45)
Accordingly, wage growth follows as
gwt =
ŵt+1
ŵt
− 1 = ht+1
ht
Â
(1−α)2
α .
Noting that ht+1 = ht = e before the transition and recalling Equation (12), the following is
then easy to verify.
Proposition 11. As long as households do not receive capital income,
(i) male health (ξm) has no impact on the growth and level of wages both before the transition
and in the long-run limit;
(ii) female health (ξf ) has no impact on the growth and level of wages before the transition but
enhances them in the long-run limit; furthermore, it speeds up the economic transition.
Thus, in the presence of externally held capital, male health loses its role in the development
process up to the economic transition. This result may come as a surprise, given that health
has an impact on the process of capital accumulation. With the wage rate now determined
exclusively by the state of technology and the international interest rate, it does not affect the
development process as long as most households do not participate in the growing returns to
capital. After the transition, male health improvements slow the process of wage growth by
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stifling human capital growth although this effect vanishes in the long-run limit. Similarly,
female health has no impact on the level and growth of wages before the transition takes place.
Nevertheless, by lowering the transition threshold, it still contributes to acceleration of the
economic take-off. By increasing the accumulation of human capital after the transition, female
health continues to contribute to economic growth even in the long-run.28
7 Discussion and conclusions
We have studied the impact of productivity- and earnings-enhancing female versus male health
investments within a dynamic general equilibrium model of economic development with endoge-
nous consumption, education, and fertility. We solved the model and studied the conditions
under which the economy switches from a low-growth regime with high fertility and no educa-
tional investments to a modern growth regime with declining fertility and increasing educational
investments. By raising female labor participation/productivity and thus the opportunity cost
of children, greater female health has a direct negative impact on fertility. While this mod-
erately enhances earnings growth during the low-growth phase, which is otherwise driven by
technology adoption, it also has important level effects: on the one hand, it lowers the earnings
threshold that must be met to initiate educational and demographic transitions; on the other
hand, it lowers the wage level by increasing aggregate labor supply. As it turns out, however,
starting from the same initial condition, an economy with better female health will always take
off at an earlier date. In contrast, by raising income at the household level, male health improve-
ments tend to increase fertility and thereby slow growth, the progress toward demographic and
economic transition, and the resulting economic take-off. These analytical results are reflected
in our numerical analysis as well.
From a development policy perspective, a case exists for health improvements to be targeted
at women (e.g., by reducing iodine deficiency or vaccinating against the human papilloma virus).
While this may also be justified on intra-household equity grounds, male health improvements
are more effective in promoting household utility in the short run. This is because in societies
in which males supply a greater share of their time to the labor market, household income
increases by more if men rather than women benefit from a health-related increase in their
earnings. Thus, a conflict may exist between the short-term interests of the household with a
28We should caution, of course, that at some point after the transition, households would participate in the
accumulation of capital, implying a change in the mechanics of growth before the long-run limit.
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stronger emphasis on male health and long-term development goals with a stronger emphasis
on female health. When health improvements benefit both sexes alike, growth is only promoted
when an economic-demographic transition has already taken place. Only then will the increase
in educational investments associated with better female health lead to an increase in the cost of
children that overcompensates for the positive income effect on fertility. Nevertheless, economic
take-off is still sped up as long as health improvements are not disproportionately enjoyed by
men. Our main conclusion, that female health is more conducive to economic development
than male health, is robust with respect to the introduction of collective rather than unitary
household preferences, the endogeneity of health investments within the household, and the
inclusion of physical capital in the production function (FDI).
To keep the model analytically tractable and for the sake of clarity, we abstracted from
several issues that would increase the realism of the model. Apart from collective household
preferences, endogenous health investments, and FDI, for which we showed that our results are
robust with respect to their inclusion, additional extensions may take into account that i) utility
itself depends on health; ii) reductions in fertility bring about endogenous increases in maternal
health; iii) politically, socially, and institutionally motivated gender-specific discrimination may
exist; iv) better male and female health comes with positive spillover effects on other household
members, contemporaneously and over time; v) in the long run, the quality versus quantity
preferences might be endogenous to economic development; vi) health interventions do not only
reduce morbidity but also mortality; and vii) educational investments may differ according
to gender. However, we have no reason to believe that relaxing the model’s assumptions to
incorporate those aspects would invalidate any of our results. Additional utility from health
would raise the benefits of health investments on top of their effect on economic development,
while maternal health improvements due to reductions in fertility would reinforce our results.
We do not consider discrimination against women in the labor market or within the household
but find that discrimination against women in terms of health may result from the maximization
of net household income. We do not wish to imply that we perceive such an outcome to be
desirable, or that preference-based discrimination against women is not an issue. But taking
into account additional sources of discrimination would only strengthen our arguments unless
it is so severe that it prevents female labor force participation altogether. Positive spillover
effects of gender-specific health on other household members would change the results only
if the spillover effects of male health were greater than the spillover effects of female health,
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which is unlikely. Considering an endogenous evolution of preferences toward a higher quality
of children as opposed to higher quantity would speed up the transition and reinforce the
mechanisms outlined above. Finally, even if undertaken by parents, gender-specific investments
in education can be shown to follow a similar trade-off as the gender-specific health investments
we examined in section 6.2. In particular, investments in female education tend to increase in
female health and decline in male health. As we have shown in Proposition 9, such a mechanism
would strengthen our results.
One last limitation of our model is that it only examines the impact on labor participation,
productivity, and economic growth of variations in morbidity (as opposed to mortality). While
such a channel has been identified as empirically relevant (e.g., Field et al., 2009), it is by no
means the only one. As Jayachandran and Lleras-Muney (2009) and Albanesi and Olivetti
(2014) show, reductions in maternal mortality also serve as a trigger for economic development
by fostering investments in female education, which ultimately translate into greater labor
participation and lower fertility. An examination of this channel would call for an extension of
our model to incorporate gender-specific educational investments. While such modeling may
provide further insights, we speculate that this would not alter dramatically the mechanics or
the results. To some extent, the sole effect of reductions in maternal mortality is to alter the
sequence of events: In this case, investments in female education increase before female labor
participation increases. By contrast, in our case, reductions in morbidity trigger greater female
participation before they trigger greater educational investments. In both cases, however, the
joint increase in education and participation comes with a reduction in fertility, which sets off
the virtuous cycle of development. That said, reductions in male mortality may also turn out to
be conducive to economic development. As Soares and Falca˜o (2008) show, greater educational
investments in children with higher life expectancy, regardless of their gender, trigger a fertility
decline. However, this does not contradict our finding that by raising the opportunity cost of
children, female health improvements exert additional leverage on economic development.
Altogether, we believe that our theoretical framework could provide guidance on household-
level empirical analyses with respect to the relations between female health and development
and between female health and household income. This offers a promising avenue for further
research.
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Appendix A
Proof of Proposition 3. Part (i): Because ht+1 = ht = e¯ in the low-growth regime, Equation
(30) simplifies to
gt =
(
At+1/At
nt/2
)1−α
− 1.
A transition from low growth to modern growth occurs if gt > 0 for all t ≥ t0. As is readily
checked, this holds if and only if At+1/At > nt/2. Substituting from Equation (4), the low-
growth level of fertility gives the condition in Equation (31). Part (ii): Assume that At+1/At = 1
in the very long run, where the economy has reached the technological boundary. Substituting
the limit values from Equations (12) and (6) into the condition gt ≥ 0 and taking logarithms
gives the condition in Equation (32).
Proof of Proposition 5. Part (i) follows immediately from Proposition 4.
Part (ii): As is readily verified from Equations (3)-(5), the redistribution dξf = −dξm = z >
0 leaves optimal consumption ct unaffected. Referring by {ut, nt, et} and {u′t, n′t, e′t} to pre- and
postredistribution levels of utility, fertility, and education, respectively, we then obtain from
Equation (1) that
ut > u
′
t ⇔ γ
[
log (nt)− log
(
n′t
)]
+ δ
[
log (e¯+ et)− log
(
e¯+ e′t
)]
> 0. (A.1)
Consider now in turn the three cases, where (a) the low-growth regime arises both pre- and
postreform, i.e., the case where ŵt = htwt < γe¯/δξfψ; (b) the modern growth regime arises
both pre- and postreform, i.e., the case where ŵt > γe¯/δξfψ; and (c) the case in which for
ŵt ∈ [γe¯/ [δ (ξf + z)ψ] , γe¯/δξfψ] the regime switches from low growth to modern growth.
Case (a): As is readily checked from Equations (4) and (5), we have nt > n
′
t = γ(ξm +
ξf )/ [(1 + γ) (ξf + z)ψ] and et = e
′
t = 0, implying immediately that the second equality in
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Equation (A.1) holds.
Case (b): Substituting from Equations (4) and (5) the modern growth values nt and et
together with
n′t =
(γ − δ)(ξm + ξf )ŵt
(1 + γ) [(ξf + z)ψŵt − e¯] (A.2)
e′t =
δ (ξf + z)ψŵt − γe¯
γ − δ , (A.3)
we can rewrite the second inequality in Equation (A.1) as
(γ − δ) {log [(ξf + z)ψŵt − e¯]− log (ξfψŵt − e¯)} > 0,
which holds because the term in curly braces is positive and γ > δ by assumption.
Case (c): Substituting from Equations (4) and (5) the value nt from the low-growth regime
and et = 0 together with n
′
t and e
′
t as from Equations (A.2) and (A.3), we can rewrite the
second inequality in (A.1) as
G (ŵt) =
〈
γ {log (γ/ξfψ)− log (γ − δ) + log [(ξf + z)ψ − e¯/ŵt]}
+δ {log (e¯/δ)− log [(ξf + z)ψŵt − e¯] + log (γ − δ)}
〉
> 0.
Gŵt < 0 for ŵt ∈ [γe¯/ [δ (ξf + z)ψ] , γe¯/δξfψ]can be verified, implying that
G (ŵt) ≥ G (γe¯/δξfψ)
=
〈
γ {log (γ/ξfψ)− log (γ − δ) + log {(ψ/γ) [γz + (γ − δ) ξf ]}}
+δ {log (e¯/δ)− log {(e¯/δξf ) [γz + (γ − δ) ξf ]}+ log (γ − δ)}
〉
= (γ − δ) {log [γz + (γ − δ) ξf ]− log (γ − δ)− log (ξf )}
> (γ − δ) {log [(γ − δ) ξf ]− log (γ − δ)− log (ξf )} = 0,
where the second inequality follows for z > 0. Hence, ut > u
′
t for ŵt ∈
[γe¯/ [δ (ξf + z)ψ] , γe¯/δξfψ], which completes the proof.
Proof of Proposition 6. Part (i) follows immediately when recalling from Equation (30) that
the growth rate declines with nt in all regimes and increases with et in the long-run limit and then
noting from Equations (4), (6), and (12) that nt is independent of λ, whereas limwtht→∞ ht+1/ht
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increases with λ. Part (ii) follows in analogy to Part (ii) of the proof of Proposition 4 with the
time to transition given by
∆ =
ln (ŵτ/λ)− ln
(
ŵt0/λ
1−α)
ln (1 + g)
with ŵτ = γe¯/δξfψ, and ŵt0 and g as defined in Equations (33) and (34), respectively. We then
have ∂∆/∂λ = −αλ−1 [ln (1 + g)]−1 < 0.
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1990 
 
IK 
30-2011 Dominik Hartmann, 
Atilio Arata 
 
MEASURING SOCIAL CAPITAL AND INNOVATION IN POOR 
AGRICULTURAL COMMUNITIES. THE CASE OF CHÁPARRA - 
PERU 
 
IK 
31-2011 Peter Spahn DIE WÄHRUNGSKRISENUNION 
DIE EURO-VERSCHULDUNG DER NATIONALSTAATEN ALS 
SCHWACHSTELLE DER EWU 
 
ECO 
32-2011 Fabian Wahl 
 
DIE ENTWICKLUNG DES LEBENSSTANDARDS IM DRITTEN 
REICH – EINE GLÜCKSÖKONOMISCHE PERSPEKTIVE 
 
ECO 
33-2011 Giorgio Triulzi, 
Ramon Scholz and 
Andreas Pyka 
 
R&D AND KNOWLEDGE DYNAMICS IN UNIVERSITY-INDUSTRY 
RELATIONSHIPS IN BIOTECH AND PHARMACEUTICALS: AN 
AGENT-BASED MODEL 
IK 
34-2011 Claus D. Müller-
Hengstenberg, 
Stefan Kirn 
 
ANWENDUNG DES ÖFFENTLICHEN VERGABERECHTS AUF 
MODERNE IT SOFTWAREENTWICKLUNGSVERFAHREN 
ICT 
35-2011 Andreas Pyka AVOIDING EVOLUTIONARY INEFFICIENCIES 
IN INNOVATION NETWORKS 
 
IK 
36-2011 David Bell, Steffen 
Otterbach and 
Alfonso Sousa-Poza 
 
WORK HOURS CONSTRAINTS AND HEALTH 
 
HCM 
37-2011 Lukas Scheffknecht, 
Felix Geiger 
A BEHAVIORAL MACROECONOMIC MODEL WITH  
ENDOGENOUS BOOM-BUST CYCLES AND LEVERAGE 
DYNAMICS 
 
ECO 
38-2011 Yin Krogmann,  
Ulrich Schwalbe 
 
INTER-FIRM R&D NETWORKS IN THE GLOBAL 
PHARMACEUTICAL BIOTECHNOLOGY INDUSTRY DURING 
1985–1998: A CONCEPTUAL AND EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS  
 
IK 
 
Nr. Autor Titel CC 
 
39-2011 
 
Michael Ahlheim, 
Tobias Börger and  
Oliver Frör 
 
 
RESPONDENT INCENTIVES IN CONTINGENT VALUATION: THE 
ROLE OF RECIPROCITY 
 
    ECO 
40-2011 Tobias Börger  
 
A DIRECT TEST OF SOCIALLY DESIRABLE RESPONDING IN 
CONTINGENT VALUATION INTERVIEWS 
 
    ECO 
41-2011 Ralf Rukwid,  
Julian P. Christ 
 
QUANTITATIVE CLUSTERIDENTIFIKATION AUF EBENE 
DER DEUTSCHEN STADT- UND LANDKREISE (1999-2008) 
    IK 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Nr. Autor Titel CC 
    
42-2012 Benjamin Schön,  
Andreas Pyka 
 
A TAXONOMY OF INNOVATION NETWORKS IK 
 
43-2012 Dirk Foremny, 
Nadine Riedel 
 
BUSINESS TAXES AND THE ELECTORAL CYCLE        ECO 
44-2012 Gisela Di Meglio, 
Andreas Pyka and 
Luis Rubalcaba 
 
VARIETIES OF SERVICE ECONOMIES IN EUROPE        IK 
45-2012 Ralf Rukwid,  
Julian P. Christ 
INNOVATIONSPOTENTIALE IN BADEN-WÜRTTEMBERG: 
PRODUKTIONSCLUSTER IM BEREICH „METALL, ELEKTRO, IKT“ 
UND REGIONALE VERFÜGBARKEIT AKADEMISCHER 
FACHKRÄFTE IN DEN MINT-FÄCHERN 
 
IK 
46-2012 Julian P. Christ,  
Ralf Rukwid 
INNOVATIONSPOTENTIALE IN BADEN-WÜRTTEMBERG: 
BRANCHENSPEZIFISCHE FORSCHUNGS- UND 
ENTWICKLUNGSAKTIVITÄT, REGIONALES 
PATENTAUFKOMMEN UND BESCHÄFTIGUNGSSTRUKTUR 
 
       IK 
47-2012 Oliver Sauter ASSESSING UNCERTAINTY IN EUROPE AND THE 
US - IS THERE A COMMON FACTOR? 
       ECO 
48-2012 Dominik Hartmann SEN MEETS SCHUMPETER. INTRODUCING STRUCTURAL AND 
DYNAMIC ELEMENTS INTO THE HUMAN CAPABILITY 
APPROACH 
 
       IK 
49-2012 Harold Paredes-
Frigolett,  
Andreas Pyka 
 
DISTAL EMBEDDING AS A TECHNOLOGY INNOVATION 
NETWORK FORMATION STRATEGY 
       IK 
50-2012 Martyna Marczak, 
Víctor Gómez 
CYCLICALITY OF REAL WAGES IN THE USA AND GERMANY: 
NEW INSIGHTS FROM WAVELET ANALYSIS 
       ECO 
51-2012 André P. Slowak DIE DURCHSETZUNG VON SCHNITTSTELLEN 
IN DER STANDARDSETZUNG: 
FALLBEISPIEL LADESYSTEM ELEKTROMOBILITÄT 
       IK 
 
52-2012 
 
Fabian Wahl 
 
WHY IT MATTERS WHAT PEOPLE THINK - BELIEFS, LEGAL 
ORIGINS AND THE DEEP ROOTS OF TRUST 
        
ECO 
 
53-2012 
 
Dominik Hartmann, 
Micha Kaiser 
 
STATISTISCHER ÜBERBLICK DER TÜRKISCHEN MIGRATION IN 
BADEN-WÜRTTEMBERG UND DEUTSCHLAND 
        
IK 
 
54-2012 
 
Dominik Hartmann, 
Andreas Pyka, Seda 
Aydin, Lena Klauß, 
Fabian Stahl, Ali 
Santircioglu, Silvia 
Oberegelsbacher, 
Sheida Rashidi, Gaye 
Onan and Suna 
Erginkoç 
 
IDENTIFIZIERUNG UND ANALYSE DEUTSCH-TÜRKISCHER 
INNOVATIONSNETZWERKE. ERSTE ERGEBNISSE DES TGIN-
PROJEKTES 
        
IK 
 
55-2012 
 
Michael Ahlheim, 
Tobias Börger and 
Oliver Frör 
 
THE ECOLOGICAL PRICE OF GETTING RICH IN A GREEN 
DESERT: A CONTINGENT VALUATION STUDY IN RURAL 
SOUTHWEST CHINA 
 
 
        
ECO 
Nr. Autor Titel CC 
 
56-2012 
 
Matthias Strifler 
Thomas Beissinger 
 
FAIRNESS CONSIDERATIONS IN LABOR UNION WAGE 
SETTING – A THEORETICAL ANALYSIS 
        
ECO 
 
57-2012 
 
Peter Spahn 
 
INTEGRATION DURCH WÄHRUNGSUNION? 
DER FALL DER EURO-ZONE 
        
ECO 
 
58-2012 
 
Sibylle H. Lehmann 
 
TAKING FIRMS TO THE STOCK MARKET:  
IPOS AND THE IMPORTANCE OF LARGE BANKS IN IMPERIAL 
GERMANY 1896-1913 
        
ECO 
 
59-2012 Sibylle H. Lehmann, 
Philipp Hauber and 
Alexander Opitz 
 
POLITICAL RIGHTS, TAXATION, AND FIRM VALUATION – 
EVIDENCE FROM SAXONY AROUND 1900 
ECO        
 
60-2012 Martyna Marczak, 
Víctor Gómez 
SPECTRAN, A SET OF MATLAB PROGRAMS FOR SPECTRAL 
ANALYSIS 
ECO        
 
61-2012 Theresa Lohse, 
Nadine Riedel 
THE IMPACT OF TRANSFER PRICING REGULATIONS ON 
PROFIT SHIFTING WITHIN EUROPEAN MULTINATIONALS 
ECO        
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Nr. Autor Titel CC 
 
62-2013 Heiko Stüber REAL WAGE CYCLICALITY OF NEWLY HIRED WORKERS ECO        
 
63-2013 David E. Bloom, 
Alfonso Sousa-Poza 
AGEING AND PRODUCTIVITY HCM 
 
64-2013 Martyna Marczak, 
Víctor Gómez 
MONTHLY US BUSINESS CYCLE INDICATORS: 
A NEW MULTIVARIATE APPROACH BASED ON A BAND-PASS 
FILTER 
 
ECO 
 
65-2013 Dominik Hartmann, 
Andreas Pyka 
INNOVATION, ECONOMIC DIVERSIFICATION AND HUMAN 
DEVELOPMENT 
IK 
 
66-2013 Christof Ernst, 
Katharina Richter and 
Nadine Riedel 
CORPORATE TAXATION AND THE QUALITY OF RESEARCH 
AND DEVELOPMENT 
ECO 
 
 
67-2013 Michael Ahlheim, 
Oliver Frör, Jiang 
Tong, Luo Jing and 
Sonna Pelz 
 
NONUSE VALUES OF CLIMATE POLICY - AN EMPIRICAL STUDY 
IN XINJIANG AND BEIJING 
ECO 
 
68-2013 Michael Ahlheim, 
Friedrich Schneider 
CONSIDERING HOUSEHOLD SIZE IN CONTINGENT VALUATION 
STUDIES 
ECO 
 
69-2013 Fabio Bertoni,  
Tereza Tykvová 
WHICH FORM OF VENTURE CAPITAL IS MOST SUPPORTIVE 
OF INNOVATION? 
EVIDENCE FROM EUROPEAN BIOTECHNOLOGY COMPANIES 
 
CFRM 
 
70-2013 Tobias Buchmann, 
Andreas Pyka  
THE EVOLUTION OF INNOVATION NETWORKS: 
THE CASE OF A GERMAN AUTOMOTIVE NETWORK 
IK 
 
71-2013 B. Vermeulen, A. 
Pyka, J. A. La Poutré 
and A. G. de Kok  
CAPABILITY-BASED GOVERNANCE PATTERNS OVER THE 
PRODUCT LIFE-CYCLE 
IK 
 
 
72-2013 
 
Beatriz Fabiola López 
Ulloa, Valerie Møller 
and Alfonso Sousa-
Poza   
 
HOW DOES SUBJECTIVE WELL-BEING EVOLVE WITH AGE?  
A LITERATURE REVIEW 
 
HCM 
 
 
73-2013 
 
Wencke Gwozdz, 
Alfonso Sousa-Poza, 
Lucia A. Reisch, 
Wolfgang Ahrens, 
Stefaan De Henauw, 
Gabriele Eiben, Juan 
M. Fernández-Alvira, 
Charalampos 
Hadjigeorgiou, Eva 
Kovács, Fabio Lauria, 
Toomas Veidebaum, 
Garrath Williams, 
Karin Bammann 
 
MATERNAL EMPLOYMENT AND CHILDHOOD OBESITY – 
A EUROPEAN PERSPECTIVE 
 
HCM 
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74-2013 
 
Andreas Haas, 
Annette Hofmann  
 
 
RISIKEN AUS CLOUD-COMPUTING-SERVICES: 
FRAGEN DES RISIKOMANAGEMENTS UND ASPEKTE DER 
VERSICHERBARKEIT 
 
HCM 
 
 
75-2013 
 
Yin Krogmann, 
Nadine Riedel and 
Ulrich Schwalbe  
 
 
INTER-FIRM R&D NETWORKS IN PHARMACEUTICAL 
BIOTECHNOLOGY: WHAT DETERMINES FIRM’S 
CENTRALITY-BASED PARTNERING CAPABILITY? 
 
ECO, IK 
 
 
76-2013 
 
Peter Spahn 
 
MACROECONOMIC STABILISATION AND BANK LENDING: 
A SIMPLE WORKHORSE MODEL 
 
ECO 
 
 
77-2013 
 
Sheida Rashidi, 
Andreas Pyka 
 
MIGRATION AND INNOVATION – A SURVEY 
 
IK 
 
 
78-2013 
 
Benjamin Schön, 
Andreas Pyka 
 
THE SUCCESS FACTORS OF TECHNOLOGY-SOURCING 
THROUGH MERGERS & ACQUISITIONS – AN INTUITIVE META-
ANALYSIS 
 
IK 
 
 
79-2013 
 
Irene Prostolupow, 
Andreas Pyka and 
Barbara Heller-Schuh 
 
TURKISH-GERMAN INNOVATION NETWORKS IN THE 
EUROPEAN RESEARCH LANDSCAPE 
 
IK 
 
 
80-2013 
 
Eva Schlenker, 
Kai D. Schmid 
 
CAPITAL INCOME SHARES AND INCOME 
INEQUALITY IN THE EUROPEAN UNION 
 
       ECO 
 
81-2013 Michael Ahlheim, 
Tobias Börger and 
Oliver Frör 
THE INFLUENCE OF ETHNICITY AND CULTURE ON THE 
VALUATION OF ENVIRONMENTAL IMPROVEMENTS 
– RESULTS FROM A CVM STUDY IN SOUTHWEST CHINA – 
       ECO 
 
82-2013 
 
Fabian Wahl DOES MEDIEVAL TRADE STILL MATTER? HISTORICAL TRADE 
CENTERS, AGGLOMERATION AND CONTEMPORARY 
ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT 
       ECO 
 
83-2013 Peter Spahn SUBPRIME AND EURO CRISIS: SHOULD WE BLAME THE 
ECONOMISTS? 
       ECO 
 
84-2013 Daniel Guffarth, 
Michael J. Barber 
THE EUROPEAN AEROSPACE R&D COLLABORATION 
NETWORK 
       IK 
 
85-2013 Athanasios Saitis KARTELLBEKÄMPFUNG UND INTERNE KARTELLSTRUKTUREN: 
EIN NETZWERKTHEORETISCHER ANSATZ 
       IK 
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86-2014 Stefan Kirn, Claus D. 
Müller-Hengstenberg 
INTELLIGENTE (SOFTWARE-)AGENTEN: EINE NEUE 
HERAUSFORDERUNG FÜR DIE GESELLSCHAFT UND UNSER 
RECHTSSYSTEM? 
 
ICT       
 
87-2014 Peng Nie, Alfonso 
Sousa-Poza 
MATERNAL EMPLOYMENT AND CHILDHOOD OBESITY IN 
CHINA: EVIDENCE FROM THE CHINA HEALTH AND NUTRITION 
SURVEY 
 
HCM        
 
88-2014 Steffen Otterbach, 
Alfonso Sousa-Poza 
JOB INSECURITY, EMPLOYABILITY, AND HEALTH: 
AN ANALYSIS FOR GERMANY ACROSS GENERATIONS 
HCM        
 
89-2014 Carsten Burhop, 
Sibylle H. Lehmann-
Hasemeyer 
 
THE GEOGRAPHY OF STOCK EXCHANGES IN IMPERIAL 
GERMANY 
ECO        
 
90-2014 Martyna Marczak, 
Tommaso Proietti 
OUTLIER DETECTION IN STRUCTURAL TIME SERIES 
MODELS: THE INDICATOR SATURATION APPROACH 
ECO        
 
91-2014 Sophie Urmetzer, 
Andreas Pyka 
VARIETIES OF KNOWLEDGE-BASED BIOECONOMIES IK        
 
92-2014 Bogang Jun,  
Joongho Lee 
THE TRADEOFF BETWEEN FERTILITY AND EDUCATION:  
EVIDENCE FROM THE KOREAN DEVELOPMENT PATH 
IK        
 
93-2014 Bogang Jun,  
Tai-Yoo Kim 
NON-FINANCIAL HURDLES FOR HUMAN CAPITAL 
ACCUMULATION: LANDOWNERSHIP IN KOREA UNDER 
JAPANESE RULE 
 
IK        
 
94-2014 Michael Ahlheim, 
Oliver Frör, 
Gerhard 
Langenberger and 
Sonna Pelz  
 
CHINESE URBANITES AND THE PRESERVATION OF RARE 
SPECIES IN REMOTE PARTS OF THE COUNTRY – THE 
EXAMPLE OF EAGLEWOOD 
ECO        
 
95-2014 Harold Paredes-
Frigolett, 
Andreas Pyka, 
Javier Pereira and 
Luiz Flávio Autran 
Monteiro Gomes 
 
RANKING THE PERFORMANCE OF NATIONAL INNOVATION 
SYSTEMS IN THE IBERIAN PENINSULA AND LATIN AMERICA 
FROM A NEO-SCHUMPETERIAN ECONOMICS PERSPECTIVE 
IK        
 
96-2014 Daniel Guffarth, 
Michael J. Barber 
 
NETWORK EVOLUTION, SUCCESS, AND REGIONAL 
DEVELOPMENT IN THE EUROPEAN AEROSPACE INDUSTRY 
IK        
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